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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BONNEVILLE PROPERTIES
INCORPORATED, a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

No. 18223

DAN SIMONS,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant Dan Simons obtained a listing to
sell real property known by the parties as the Fashion
Fabrics Warehouse, which listing was advertised through the
Multiple Listing Service of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors.
Bonneville Properties, Inc., Plaintiff-Respondent, relying
upon such listing and Simons' published commission split of
sixty percent (60%) to the selling office and forty percent
(40%) to the listing office, introduced the ultimate buyer
of the warehouse to Simons.

Subsequent to the introduction

of such buyer by Bonneville to Simons, Simons reversed his
commission split without knowledge of or agreement of
Bonneville.

When sale of the warehouse was consummated,

Bonneville received forty percent (40%) of the corrunission
then payable between the parties with sixty percent (60%)
being paid to Simons.

Bonneville thereafter brought this

action against Simons for breach of contract and unjust
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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enrichment alleging damages for the additional twenty
percent (20%) of commissions.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson,
judgment was granted in favor of Bonneville in the sum of
$11,000.00 together with prejudgment interests and costs for
a total award of $14,925.83.

The Court concluded that

Simons made an of fer for a contract and pursuant to such
offer, Bonneville introduced to Simons the ultimate
~urchaser

of the Fashion Fabric Warehouse.

Notwithstanding

the consummation of the sale and purchase at a date
subsequent to a unilated change of commission splits by
Simons, the activities of Bonneville were significant to the
sale entitling Bonneville to commissions based upon the
original terms of sixty percent (60%) to the selling office.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Simons seeks a reversal of the district court's
judgment in favor of Bonneville.

Bonneville resists and

opposes the relief sought by Defendant and Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 25th day of September, 1974, the Defendant Dan
Simons doing business as Real Estate Consultants obtained an
exclusive listing of property known as the Fashion Fabrics
Warehouse.

Such listing was advertised through the Salt

Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service.

At the

date of publication of the Fashion Fabrics listing, Simons'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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published commission split to members of the Multiple
Listing Service was sixty percent (60%) to the selling
office and forty percent (40%) to the listing office.

Some

time during the month of December, 1974, L. Richard Sorensen
and Dennis Christensen, employees and agents of Bonneville
Properties, Inc., each saw the Fashion Fabrics listing in
the Multiple Listing Service and also became aware of the
commission split as advertised and offered by the Defendant
Simons.

During the applicable periods of 1974 and 1975

.Plaintiff Bonneville Properties, Inc. was authorized to act
within the State of Utah as a corporate broker in that L.
Richard Sorensen was licensed as a real estate broker for
and on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Subsequent to the discovery of such listing, Bonneville
was advised by Simons that Fashion Fabrics would be willing
to accept an offer for purchase of the subject property at a
price of $3,800,000.00, with a cash down payment of
$850,000.00 and the balance of $2,950,000.00 payable in
accordance with the terms of a real estate contract.
Such terms would also include a lease back of the property
by Fashion Fabrics.

After being advised of the acceptable

terms of an offer, the Plaintiff, by and through its agents
L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen, met with Simons
in December, 1974, at the offices of Gary Jenkins and at
this meeting it was disclosed to Simons that A.K. Utah
Properties was a prospective purchaser of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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Fashion Fabrics Warehouse.
that Bonneville

Simons admits in his pleadings

introduced to him the party who purchased

the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse.
On the 2nd day of January, 1975, effective January 10,
1975, Simons unilaterally revised his commission split
arrangement by advising the Salt Lake Board of Realtors by
letter that all commissions would thereafter be paid forty
percent (40%) to the selling office and sixty percent (60%)
to the listing office.
~hange,

On the effective date of such

no written agreements had been reached between A.K.

Utah Properties and Fashion Fabrics or A.K. Utah Properties
and Robert Swanner Company regarding the sale of the subject
property and an exchange which was to take place thereafter.
Although Plaintiff's agent, Dennis Christensen,
subsequent to the meeting in December, 1974, requested to be
in attendance at all negotiations between Fashion Fabrics
and A.K. Utah, Simons advised Mr. Christensen that he did
not want him in attendance at such meetings.

Nevertheless,

as early as January 16, 1975, attorneys for A.K. Utah
advised Fashion Fabrics and Defendant Dan Simons that they
expressed an intent to purchase the Fashion Fabrics
Warehouse subject to certain conditions and the preparation
and execution of final documents.

The intent as expressed a

letter of January 16, 1975, providing essentially that the
purchase was to be $3,800,000.00 with a down payment of
$850,000.00.

The balance of the purchase price,
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$2,950,000.00 was payable in accordance with a terms of a
real estate contract.

Additional terms were set forth in

the letter but included the lease back of the Fashion
Fabrics Warehouse by Fashion Fabrics.
Notwithstanding Mr. Simons' instructions to Mr.
Christensen, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Sorensen were ready and
willing at all times to offer assistance to the Defendant
Simons with respect to the sale.
In February, 1975, A.K. Utah Properties and Fashion
Fabrics entered into contracts dated February 3, 1975, for
the purchase and sale of the Fashion Fabric Warehouse.

The

contracts provided that A.K. Utah Properties would purchase
the subject property at $3,800,000.00 with a down payment of
$900,000.00 and the balance of $2,900,000.00 to be paid in
accordance with the terms of a uniform land sales contract.
Such contract further provided that Fashion Fabrics would
lease back the subject property from the purchaser.

A

closing of the transaction and a conveyance of the property
occurred on March 27, 1975.

Immediately thereafter A.K.

Utah exchanged the property with property owned by the
Robert Swaner Company.
As a result of the sale of the Fashion Fabrics
Warehouse,, commissions totalling $125,000.00 became due and
payable to the participating brokers, $100,000.00 of which
is in dispute in the present action.

Plaintiff was paid the

sum of $40,000.00 representing forty percent (40%) of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conunissions, all of which were paid in accordance with the
conunission split arrangement which was effective as of the
10th day of January, 1975.

The Defendant Simons was paid

conunissions totalling $60,000.00

($38,000.00 in cash and

$22,000.00 represented by 17,600 restricted shares of
Fashion Fabric stock).

Bonneville Properties received its

last conunission payment on the 1st day of May, 1976.
On or about June 3, 1976, Plaintiff's agent Dennis
Christensen filed suit on his own behalf against the
Defendant Simons in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah seeking damages for alleged violations of
anti-trust laws of the United States alleging a conspiracy
to deprive Christensen from his fair share of the real
estate commission attributable to the sale of the Fashion
Fabrics Warehouse and for a breach of contract.
was not a party to the Federal action.

Plaintiff

On the 3rd day of

December, 1976, and in settlement of such action, Dennis
Christensen executed a general release of all of his claims
in favor of the Defendant Simons with respect to any claims
or causes of action attributable to the transaction
involving the sale of Fashion Fabrics Warehouse.
The commission arrangement and agreement which existed
between the Plaintiff and its agent Dennis Christensen
provided that Plaintiff was to receive ten percent (10%) of
all commissions to defray costs with the remaining amount of
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commissions to be split equally between the agent and the
Plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
I

A.

Plaintiff Bonneville has earned its commission by

substantial performance.
Restatement of Contracts, Section 45, sets forth the
generally accepted principle that where substantial
performance has been completed by an offeree, a unilateral
contract becomes irrevocable for a specified or reasonable
amount of time.

Section 45 states:

If an offer for a unilateral contract is made,
and part of the consideration requested in the
offer is given or tendered by the offeree in
response thereto, the offeror is bound by a
contract, the duty of immediate performance of
which is conditional on the full consideration
being given or tendered within the time stated
in the offer, or, if no time is stated therein,
within a reasonable time.
Comment B provides further explanation.
. . . The main of fer includes as a subsidiary
promise, necessarily implied, that if part of
the requested performance is given, the offeror
will not revoke his offer, and that if tender is
made it will be accepted. Part performance or
tender may thus furnish consideration for the
subsidiary. Moreover, merely acting in
justifiable reliance on an offer may in some
cases serve as sufficient reason for making a
promise binding.
(See Section 90.)
The principles enumerated in the Restatement of
Contracts have been adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the
matter of Auerbach's, Inc. vs. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1977).

There, the Court addressing the ability of an

employer to withdraw an offer made to an employee for a
pension after completion of years of service concluded that
after substantial performance the of fer could not be
withdrawn.

At page 378, the Court concluded:

According to Kimball this offer was extended to
him by Auerbach's in the 1950's. Auerbach's
contends it revoked the offer on April 26, 1971.
Since Kimball had performed a substantial part
of the performance required in Auerbach's
alleged offer, the offeror could not withdraw
the offer, and would be bound by its promise.
(Citations omitted.)
In the present controversy, Simons made a similar offer
to Bonneville.

Simons through the Multiple Listing Service

offered that in the event another brokerage company were
able to find a purchase of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse
that such brokerage company would be entitled to the payment
of sixty percent (60%) of the commissions earned.

Upon

notice of such offer and after conununications with Simons,
Bonneville, through its agents, disclosed to Simons a
prospective purchaser.

Subsequent to such performance on

the part of Bonneville, Simons attempted to modify the terms
of his prior offer by reducing the commission split payable
to the selling office.

Simons nevertheless agreed that the

disclosure of the prospective buyer was "significant" with
respect to this transaction.

(TR.184)

Therefore, in

accordance with the rule set forth in the Restatement of
Contracts and as adopted by the Supreme Court of the State
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Utah, the offer of Simons became irrevocable allowing
Bonneville to thereafter supply the remaining consideration
requested, assuming arguendo that any further efforts were
required on the part of the Plaintiff.
B.

Bonneville Properties, Incorporated has Substantially

Performed its Contract with the Defendant.
There can be no dispute in the controversy before the
Court that A.K. Utah Properties ultimately, for whatever
reason, purchased the interests of Fashion Fabrics in the
Fashion Fabrics Warehouse, and that as a result of such
purchase, a commission became due and payable to Defendant,
Dan Simons.

Notwithstanding the admission of Simons that

Bonneville was paid in accordance with the commission split
in effect as of January 10, 1975, Simons now contends that
Bonneville did not perform its agreements thereby precluding
it from any claim to further payments.

Simons asserts that

Plaintiff is not entitled to additional commission because
if failed to produce a written binding offer from a buyer
ready, willing and able to purchase in accordance with the
terms of the Simons' listing and that such offer did not
exist as of the effective date of the assignment.

It has

been established, however, in the matter of Armstrong vs.
J.H. Webber & Co., 158 P. 957

(Wash. 1916) that the law of

procuring cause is not applicable with respect to suits
between brokers or salesmen and brokers.
Enos, 318 P. 2d 66

(Cal. App. 1957).

See also Draft vs.

What is significant and
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
-12I

~

determinative of the rights of the parties is the contract
between the respective brokers.

Armstrong, supra.

In the

instant case, the contract between the Plaintiff and
Defendant is found to include the terms set forth in
Paragraph 17 of the Multiple Listing Rules and Regulations.
(Exhibit 3-P)
When one member sells or exchanges property
listed with the service by another member, the
gross commission shall be divided on a
previously agreed basis.
The previously agreed basis, that published in the Multiple
Listing Service, provided that sixty percent (60%) would be
paid to the selling office.

The issue in the present

controversy then is whether or not the Plaintiff sold the
property listed with the Defendant, and if not, whether such
performance was excused by the conduct of the Defendant.
The facts in the present controversy are most
appropriately addressed by the law and facts as set forth in
the matter of Bowie vs. Martin, 85 A.2d, 786
1952).

(Maryland

In that action, the plaintiff and defendant had

agreed that if plaintiff were to sell certain property,
plaintiff would be entitled to split a commission on a 50-50
basis.

The evidence established that the defendant had on

numerous occasions previously contacted the ultimate
purchasers and that these contracts occurred over a period
of time from 1947 to May of 1950.

Notwithstanding these

contacts, the plaintiff showed the property in question to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the ultimate purchaser in April of 1950 and thereafter made
several attempts to contact the defendant broker regarding a
proposal for purchase.

After these activities of the

plaintiff, the prospective purchasers contacted the
defendant broker directly with an offer and the defendant
broker wrote the contract.

(Emphasis added.)

Thereafter,

with some minor changes made by an attorney, the purchasers
signed the agreement and purchased the property.

The

appellate court upheld the decision of the trial court which
found that the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the
commission on the grounds that the purchasers went to the
defendant as a result of the efforts and activities of the
plaintiff.

The Court further concluded that there was no

evidence to justify any assertion by the defendant that the
plaintiff was inactive or dilatory or acted in bad faith so
as to preclude recovery.
In the case before this Court, it is apparent and
admitted by Simons that the activities of Bonneville were a
"substantial" factor in consummating the sale between A.K.
Utah and Fashion Fabrics.

Although negotiations were

conducted by others, as was the fact in the matter of Bowie
vs. Martin, such negotiations would not have taken place but
for the activities of Bonneville.

As in the case of Bowie,

there is no evidence to indicate that Bonneville was
inactive, dilatory or acted in bad faith, but in fact, the
evidence demonstrates that Bonneville, through its agents,

IH
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attempted to involve itself in negotiations, but was
excluded

~y

the request of Simons.

Therefore, as in the

matter of Bowie vs. Martin, the activities of Bonneville are
sufficient to constitute a sale and Bonneville thereby
earned its commission.

By Simons's own conduct and

admissions arising therefrom, such activities were
sufficient for Fashion Fabrics and Simons to previously pay
Bonneville $40,000.00 in accordance with the modified
commission split arrangement.
The conclusion that Bonneville is entitled to its
commission is further substantiated by the facts of
Armstrong vs. J.H. Webber & Co., supra.

In that case, the

plaintiff entered into a contract with a broker to receive
50% of all commissions made through her efforts on sales of
a rooming house and hotel.

The plaintiff thereafter

negotiated an exchange of an apartment and rooming house and
was discharged by the defendant broker about the time that
the transaction was consummated.

Although the defendant

broker closed the matter himself, the Court concluded that
the evidence was sufficient to uphold the trial court's
verdict that the plaintiff was entitled to payment of her
commissions.

This wus not withstanding the fact that the

contract ultimately concluded between the parties differed
in terms from the one originally talked about, since it was
one continuous transaction from its origination to its
consummation.
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Bonneville in this action is also entitled to an award
of the additional commission on the principles set forth in
the matter of Boyer vs. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).
Although clearly addressing issues with respect to a
brokerage arrangement between an owner and broker, the Court
adopted the principle "that a party to a real estate listing
agreement cannot prevent or interfere with the performance
of the agreement and then assert the non-performance as a
defense".

Boyer Company, supra, at page 1114.

The

uncontroverted evidence established at trial in this matter
demonstrates that Simons precluded Bonneville from further
performing in assisting or otherwise negotiating with the
respective parties to complete the sale.

Therefore, Simons

cannot now be heard to complain of any alleged
non-performance on behalf of Bonneville.

Furthermore,

notwithstanding the fact that Bonneville did not participate
in final negotiations does not necessarily preclude
Bonneville from recovery.

In discussing the issue of

procuring cause between a broker and owner, the Utah Supreme
Court in the matter of Frederick May & Company, Inc. vs.
Dunn, 368 P.2d 266

(Utah 1962)

stated at page 269:

Usually, whether the broker first approaches, or
brings to the attention of the buyer that the
property is for sale, or brings the buyer into
the picture, is considerable weight in
determining whether the buyer (sic - broker?) is
the procuring cause of sale. The fact that the
sale was consummated without participation by
the broker in the final negotiation does not

I~
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preclude him from recovering his commission if
the sale was otherwise procured by him.
All the principles enumerated above can best be
summarized as stated by the Court in the matter of De
Benedictis vs. D. Gerechoff, 339 A.2d 225 (N.J. App. 1975)
at page 229:
In co-broker agreements the broker who furnishes
the buyer to the seller even though the ultimate
sell is for a lesser price, is entitled to share
in the commission provided, however, that there
has been no significant breach in the
negotiations.
(Citations omitted.)
In the matter before this Court, the evidence is clear
and is admitted by Simons that Bonneville furnished the
buyer to the seller.

Furthermore, the evidence establishes

that there was no break in negotiations between the parties
and that in light of the introduction occurring in late
December 1974 and a letter of intent being signed on January
16, 1975, the matter went together very quickly after such
introduction by Bonneville.

The evidence clearly indicates

that but for this introduction and notwithstanding the
efforts of Simons the sale is directly attributable to
Bonneville.

Bonneville thus performed its original contract

with Simons and as such is entitled to payment of an
additional commission all in accordance with the original
published commission split.
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C.

Bonneville is Presumed to be Capable of Completing its

Contract with Simons.
Simons implies that Bonneville, by its agent Dennis
Christensen, was incapable of completing the sale between
Fashion Fabrics and A.K. Utah and that this justified a
change in the commission split precluding Bonneville from
payment of any additional commission.

Simons did not raise

this matter as a defense in the pleadings, at trial or at a
time when Bonneville was paid $40,000.00 as selling agent.
Plaintiff now asserts that this issue is improperly before
the Court.
Notwithstanding Simons' failure to raise this issue,
Bonneville asserts that resolution of the issue is in its
favor.

Simons ignores the facts established at trial as

well as the statutory licensing requirements for brokers
imposed by the State of Utah.

Not only was Dennis

Christensen to be involved in the sale and negotiations
regarding the sale of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse to A.K.
Utah Properties, but L. Richard Sorensen, the official
broker for Bonneville, was to be involved.

Mr. Sorensen had

met with Defendant Simons to discuss the terms of a proposed
offer and later attended the meeting whereby Simons was
advised of the potential purchaser.

Mr. Sorensen expected

to continue with the transaction, and in fact, made several
telephone calls to monitor the progress of the transaction.
As a licensed real estate broker for Bonneville, Mr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sorensen and Bonneville have been authorized by the State of
Utah to engage in any activity of a real estate broker, as
defined by Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended), including but not limited to the sale of
industrial and commercial property.

"With due regard for

the paramount interest of the public," Mr. Sorensen was
required to demonstrate to the real estate examiners prior
to the issuance of his broker's license his honesty,
integrity, truthfulness, reputation and his competency.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 61-2-6

(1953, as amended).

By

the mere act of licensing, the State of Utah has concluded
that Mr. Sorensen and Bonneville have met certain levels of
competency.

This Court must, therefore, presume and

conclude that where no evidence exists to the contrary
Bonneville and Mr. Sorensen were competent.

Simons neither

raised Bonneville's competency as an issue nor offered any
proof that Bonneville and/or L. Richard Sorensen were
incapable of performing its contract with Simons.

Beyond

its statutory right to act as a broker, it is not
Bonneville's obligation to prove its competency, but Simons'
obligation to prove Bonneville's incompetency.

Simons has

totally failed to prove this fact.
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II

DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO A.MEND HIS ANSWER
SHOULD BE CONFIRMED
As set forth in Defendant-Appellant's Brief, Simons
requested leave to amend his Answer five days prior to
trial.

Simons's Motion was argued before the Court

immediately prior to trial on August 31, 1981.

As Simons

stated in his brief, Bonneville opposed this Motion on the
grounds that Bonneville was unprepared to offer any evidence
.concerning the agency relationship which may have existed
between A.K. Utah and Jelco.

A particularly important

witness, Gary Jenkins, was no longer residing within the
State of Utah but in fact resided in Phoenix, Arizona.

The

representative of A.K. Utah at trial, Mr. Emanuel Floor, did
not enter into his employment with A.K. Utah until January
1, 1975, a time subsequent to the introduction.

As a

consequence, the Court denied Simons' Motion concluding that
the prejudice to the Plaintiff outweighed the justice which
might be served in allowing amendment to Simons' Answer.
It is a well accepted principle of law that application
for leave to amend a pleading is ordinarily addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court and that this discretion
will not be disturbed upon appeal except in a case of abuse
of such discretion.

Benson vs. Oregon Shortline R. Co., 35

U. 241, 99 P. 1072.

The Utah Supreme Court has further

stated that a more liberal rule would be applied in cases
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where amendments are offered before trial than where offered
during or after trial.

At trial the parties might be taken

by surprise or handicapped in the meeting of new
allegations.

Johnson vs. Brinkerhoff, 89 U. 530, 57 P. 2d

1132.

In the case before the Court, Simons admitted in his
pleadings, filed almost six (60) years before trial that
Bonneville had introduced Simons to the party who purchased
the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse.

Simons' motion sought to

amend this admission, thereafter denying the same.

As a

consequence, an issue would immediately have arisen
concerning Gary Jenkins and Jelco's authority to act for and
on behalf of A.K. Utah.

This question of principle-agency

relationship was not at issue during the discovery period of
this case and was only raised by the motion of Simons
immediately prior to trial.

Inasmuch as Jelco's past

representative was then residing in the State of Arizona and
inasmuch as no representative of A.K. Utah was available for
the applicable period of time, Bonneville was placed at
great prejudice in presenting evidence of this potential
issue at the time of trial.

Bonneville had in fact relied

upon the status of the pleadings for a period of
approximately six· (6) years.

To place such a major question

at issue immediately prior to trial was unjustifiable.

By

the same argument, Simons' motion for leave to file an
amendment to conform to the evidence was improper.

With
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Simons' admission, Bonneville was not obligated to introduce
evidence of Jenkin's or Jelco's authority to act for A.K.
Utah and the district court's refusal to grant Simons'
motion was proper.
III
NO PREJUDICIAL ERRORS OCCURRED AT TRIAL REQUIRING REVERSAL
OF THE COURT'S JUDGMENT
A.

Plaintiff had authority to prosecute this action.
At trial, the Defendant moved to dismiss Bonneville's

.action alleging that Bonneville lacked statutory authority
to prosecute the same pursuant to the provisions of Section
61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).

In

essence, Simons asserted that Bonneville, as a corporation,
was not duly licensed as a real estate broker and therefore
could not maintain its action for recovery of the
commission.

In support of this motion, Simons filed the

Affidavit of Mr. Steven Francis, Director of the Real Estate
Division of the State of Utah.

Thereafter, however, Mr.

Francis testified and further explained the procedure for
licensing of corporations.

In this regard, the Court noted

certain inconsistencies between Mr. Francis' Affidavit and
his testimony thereafter ruling in favor of Bonneville's
right to prosecute this action.
Mr. Steven Francis explained that the Department of
Business Regulation did not issue licenses to corporations
per se but that they did issue licenses in the name of
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corporations provided that simultaneously therewith a broker
was designated broker for the corporation.

Mr. Francis

thereafter testified that this procedure was followed by
Bonneville for the years 1974 and 1975 and that nothing
further was required of Bonneville for the applicable
periods of time.

(TR. pages 210 - 216.)

As such, Bonneville was licensed as a broker and had
performed all activities required of it by the Department of
Business Regulations.

Section 61-2-2, Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended), provides that a real estate broker can
be a corporation and where Bonneville has satisfied the
State of Utah it must be treated as such.

Certainly, this

compliance would allow Bonneville to prosecute this action
as a real estate broker.
B.

Denial of Proof regarding Custom and Usage was Proper.
21 Am Jur 2d, Customs ahd Usages, Section 31, sets

forth:
Where a custom or usage is a special or
particular one, where is local in character, the
party who proposes to rely upon it is required
to aver it in his pleadings; otherwise he
cannot, or the objection of this adversary,
prove it.
Such a rule has equal application to a defendant.
In the present controversy, Simons made a general
denial regarding the existence of a contract between
Bonneville and himself.

At trial, however, Simons' counsel

made an attempt to introduce evidence regarding custom and
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usage among real estate brokers in the area of commercial
and industrial real estate.

Bonneville objected to the

introduction of such evidence based upon Simons' failure to
plead the same.

Bonneville asserts that the very reason for

requiring custom and usage to be specifically plead is to
give the opposing party an opportunity to talk with
witnesses, to determine the existence of custom and usage,
and if the same exists to obtain witnesses to testify
concerning the same.

Where a custom is not of such

?Otariety among the world that the Court and the public can
take notice of it, notice pleading requires that the custom
be specifically pleaded.

Because the custom Simons wished

to rely upon was not of such general knowledge, introduction
of evidence regarding the same amounted to surprise to
Bonneville, which surprise would have resulted in prejudice
.to Bonneville.

Be~ause

Simons did not specifically plead

this defense, the Court's ruling was appropriate and no
evidence exists to show that the Court's discretion was
abused.
C.

Plaintiff is Entitled to Prejudgment Interest.
Section 15-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)

provided during the applicable dates of this suit that :
The legal rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or things in
action shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
This Court has previously held in actions for breach of
contract or for actions upon debts overdue, that interest at
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six percent (6%) per annum is allowable.

See Salt Wet Wash

Laundry vs. Colorado Animal By-products Co., 104 U. 385, 140
P.2d 344.

Wasatch Min. Co. vs. Crescent Min. Co., 7 U. 8,

24 P. 586, Affirm 151 U.S. 317, 338 Lawyer Ed. L.Ed. 177, 14
S. Ct. 348.

As a consequence, the Court concluded that

Bonneville was entitled to prejudgment interest at six
percent (6%) per annum from the 1st day of May, 1976, the
date Bonneville was to receive final payment upon all other
commissions.
D.

Bonneville has not Waived any Claim for Commissions.
Simons asserts that because Bonneville's real estate

agent, Dennis Christensen, brought an action in the federal
court directly against Simons for alleged anti-trust
violations, that such suit necessarily precludes the claim
of Bonneville.

The evidenced adduced at trial clearly shows

that the releases granted were granted by Dennis
Christensen, individually, and in no way purported to be a
release of any claims that Bonneville may have had against
Simons.
Section 61-2-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)
provides:
No person, partnership, association or
corporation shall bring or maintain an action in
any court of this state for the recovery of
commission, a fee or compensation for any act
done or service rendered the doing or rendering
of which is prohibited under the provision of
this act to other than licensed real estate
brokers, unless such person was duly licensed
hereunder as a real estate broker at the time of
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the doing of such act or the rendering of such
service.
As such, the claim for commissions as asserted in this
action belonged to Bonneville and only to Bonneville.
Because Dennis Christensen was not an agent of Bonneville
for purposes of the federal court action, nor did he purport
to be, nothing transpiring therein including the release
granted by Dennis Christensen can be binding upon the
Plaintiff Bonneville as it relates to its claim.
Even at trial, Simons simply asserted that Bonneville
was precluded from recovering the amount due Christensen
(Transcript 324).

Certainly, such release of an individual

cannot be extended to a former principal for which the
former agent had no present authority.
CONCLUSION
It is a well established rule within the State of Utah
that the Suprem~~~ouii will review the evidence and all
inferences to be drawn from such evidence most favorable to
the findings of the trier of fact.
Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570

(1965).

Smith vs. Gallegos, 16
Upon examination of the

evidence in this light, one must conclude that as a result
of the contract offer made by the Defendant Dan Simons, as
published in the Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple
Listing Service, the Plaintiff became entitled to the
payment of
i~s

cornmis~i6ns

totalling $60,000.00 as a result of

efforts in finding a buyer who purchased the Fashion
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Fabrics Warehouse.

The Defendant Simons agreed that this

activity was significant, significant enough that the
Plaintiff was paid commissions according to the commission
split effective January 10, 1975, in the sum of $40,000.00.
Because the Plaintiff was precluding from changing the
commission split once substantial performance had been made
by Bonneville, Bonneville was entitled to judgment against
the Defendant Dan Simons for the additional sum of
$20,000.00, minus $9,000.00, the amount released by Dennis
Christensen.

Upon the sum of $11,000.00, Bonneville is

entitlted to interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date that Defendant was otherwise entitled to payment of
interest.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/2-

day of October, 1982.

Attorney for Plaintiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

/L-

day of October, 1982,

I

two copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent
were hand-delivered to Parker M. Neilson and Mary Lou Godbe,
318 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, attorneys
for Defendant-Appellant.
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